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TITLE VII CONSENT DECREES: AFFIRMATIVE
INACTION?
[I]n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity
due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or
national origin.'
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,2 proscribes
employment discrimination by making it a violation of federal
law "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." '3 Upon a finding that an unlawful act
of employment discrimination has occurred, Title VII provides
that it may be enjoined and that the court may order any
affirmative action that may be appropriate including, but not
limited to, "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or with-
out back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate." 4
Thus, the focal point of any employment discrimination
case becomes the remedies section of the United States Code
-section 2000e-5(g). 5 This section dictates the types of
1. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
4. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
5. Id. § 2000e-5(g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged
in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue
from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable dili-
gence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to
reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall
require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of
a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an
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relief that will be available. The most preferred form of relief,
under that provision, is the consent decree, a judicially ap-
proved pretrial settlement between the parties.' However,
unless one is a Title VII specialist, armed with previous expe-
rience in the drafting and implementing of consent decrees, it
is very difficult to tell whether any particular decree is "good";
that is, whether it has satisfied, to the fullest extent possible,
the Title VII objectives of eradicating employment discrimi-
nation and making "whole" each employee who has suffered
from such discrimination.'
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was
refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
6. The vast majority of Title VII cases ought to be concluded by
negotiated settlements rather than by trials followed by judicially devised
remedies. Once the parties have vigorously pursued discovery, it is often
all over but the shouting. The evidence in Title VII cases frequently
consists of little more than documents and data. Once this had been
produce-', the parties are in a posititon to settle the matter without going
through the time and expense of a trial.
G. COOPER, H. Ras & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LmGATION 415 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION]. In fact, the "boiler plate" language which
states the reasons behind consent decrees usually reads, "to avoid costly and lengthy
litigation." Consent Decree, Gray v. Tribune Publishing Co., No. C-74-2361 GBH, at
2 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 18, 1976) [hereinafter Tribune Decree].
However, that vigorous pursual of discovery may be quite costly for the Title VII
practitioner who may have to work on a case for a number of years without compensa-
tion in hopes of being awarded her attorney's fees. "Plaintiffs should be aware that
extensive discovery may be undertaken by the defendants. Typically, the plaintiff in
a Title VII suit can expect extensive interrogatories and the taking of his deposition
at least once." NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LEGAL SERVICES MANUAL FOR TITLE
VII LITIGATION 55 (1975).
Some recent Supreme Court decisions have called into question the receptivity
courts would give a Title VII case actually brought to trial. In Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that in order to prove the unconstitutionality of
alleged racial discrimination in employment, the plaintiff must show intent to discrim-
inate; racially disparate impact is not enough. Although the court was not disallowing
disparate impact as a means of proving discrimination under Title VII, this holding
may be viewed as threatening to Title VII cases. And in Gilbert v. General Electric
Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court held that it was not sex discrimination under Title
VII to deny disability insurance for pregnancy, for that policy does not discriminate
against women as opposed to men, but differentiates between pregnant women and
unpregnant people. In that same decision, the Court noted that EEOC guidelines are
not entitled to "great deference" in analyzing congressional intent. Id. at 140-41.
7. Two points need to be made here: First, within the realm of "good" decrees,
the employer or employee may be favored to a greater or lesser degree. To this extent,
this comment will define "good" from the employee's point of view. Second, remedial
provisions will vary if one is representing a class or an individual. The discussion to
follow will focus on class remedies.
TITLE VII CONSENT DECREES
In order to facilitate the drafting of consent decrees which
fulfill these objectives, this comment will first, briefly examine
the general types of Title VII remedies available for employ-
ment discrimination. Then, drawing almost totally from pro-
posed or judically approved consent decrees, it will identify key
substantive provisions which can put the action into any af-
firmative action plan, contributing to its effectiveness. By
identifying these provisions, the author hopes to supply some
guidelines for the practitioner faced with the settlement of an
employment discrimination lawsuit.
TITLE VII REMEDIES
Purpose
Under section 2000e-5(g), two basic forms of relief are
available to remedy Title VII violations: negative injunctions
and mandatory (affirmative) injunctions.' The former is pros-
criptive, stopping the unfair system or practice, while the latter
is both compensatory-adjusting for past wrongs-and correc-
tive-creating a new system of practices that will be fair.' A
court may impose either or both of these forms of relief upon
an employer who has been guilty of a Title VII violation.
Although all consent decrees specify that the defendant
employer has not been found guilty of discrimination, in nego-
tiating "a meretricious Title VII case, the plaintiff always has
recourse to his or her federal right to redress in court. That
factor alone may suggest that the best negotiating approach is
from the outset to ask your adversary for what you believe a
court would order and to tell your adversary, 'Either you meet
my demands or the court will order you to do so."'1
The courts, in determining what they will order the defen-
dant to do, have prescribed relief on the basis of their interpre-
tation of the somewhat abbreviated language of section 2000e-
5(g), the legislative history of that section, and precedent es-
tablished thereunder. These materials, taken together, clearly
indicate that the central purpose of these two basic forms of
relief is to make the aggrieved party "whole," by eliminating
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
9. See FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 430, where the authors
divide the forms of relief into three categories: proscriptive, corrective, and compensa-
tory. This comment will treat the latter two as variations within the single category of
affirmative relief.
10. Id. at 416.
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the effects of past discrimination as well as preventing simi-
larly illegal discrimination in the future."
Thus, the primary fuction of any consent decree is to fulfill
this "make whole" objective. In order to achieve this result, it
becomes necessary to examine the key provisions that should
be a part of any successful consent decree.
CONSENT DECREE PROVISIONS
Introduction
A perusal of only a few consent decrees would illustrate
that the specific remedial provisions within them vary as much
as the factual situations upon which they are premised. That
is, of course, to be expected, for a good decree should be tailor-
made for its parties, with the make-whole objective in mind.
In order to fulfill. the requirements of that goal, it is benefi-
cial to review other decrees, a task made difficult by both the
lack of ready access to such decrees and the time involved in
reviewing them. What follows, therefore, is a capsulized discus-
sion of the general categories of consent decree provisions, such
provisions having been drawn from a sampling of Title VII
consent decrees and settlements. Although an attempt has
been made to touch on every potential type of provision, the
11. A section-by-section analysis introduced by Senator Williams to accompany
the Conference Report on the 1972 amendment to Title VII speaks to the "make whole"
purpose of the new section 2000e-5(g):
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide
discretion in exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most com-
plete relief possible. In dealing with the present section [2000e-5(g)] the
courts have stressed that the scope of relief under the Act is intended to
make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attain-
ment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particu-
lar unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that
persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful em-
ployment practice be so far as possible, restored to a position where they
would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972). The Supreme Court strongly reiterated this "make whole"
purpose in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), where it stated that:
It is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.
Title VII deals with legal injuries of an economic character occa-
sioned by racial or other antiminority discrimination. The terms
"complete justice" and "necessary relief" have acquired a clear meaning
in such circumstances. Where racial discrimination is concerned, the
[district] court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree
which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the
past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.
Id. at 418.
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list is not exhaustive, and it is up to the individual Title VII
practitioner to draw from these general guidelines, the specifics
most suited to the situation with which she or he is dealing.
Proscriptive Orders
Whatever the specific circumstances of an individual case
happen to be, every consent decree should include a broad
proscriptive order enjoining illegal discrimination in the future.
Based on those decrees examined, its form is usually a simple
prohibition of any future discrimination because of race, color,
sex, or national origin which is in violation of Title VII.' The
effect of such an injunction against illegal discrimination is to
permit the court to hold in contempt any party who continues
to engage in such discrimination.
For the same reason, the decree should also enjoin any
retaliatory action against any complaining employee.' 3 Such a
provision ensures that employees who have asserted or who
continue to assert their Title VII rights will not be discrimi-
nated against because of their exercise of those rights.
Compensatory Affirmative Relief
In addition to these broad proscriptive orders, consent de-
crees should provide very specific affirmative remedies to com-
pensate for past discrimination as well as to make corrections
in the employer's practices which would otherwise continue to
result in discriminatory effects. Compensatory relief may con-
sist of economic benefits such as back pay and fringe benefits,
promotions and transfers, and recruitment of those who were
dismissed or refused employment on account of the employer's
12. An example of a proscriptive order of this kind can be found in Tribune
Decree, supra note 6, at 9. The Tribune decree provided: "Company and Union shall
not discriminate against any person because of race, color or national origin in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. or
42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id.
13. The predetermination settlement in United States Equal Employment Op-
portunity Comm'n v. Xerox Corp. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.] [hereinafter cited
as Xerox Settlement] states:
The [defendants] agree that there shall continue to be no discrimination
or retaliation of any kind against any person because of opposition to any
practice declared unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, or because of the filing of a charge, giving of testimony or
assistance, or participation in any manner in any investigation, proceed-
ing or hearing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Id. at 3.
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discriminatory activities. Provisions for this type of affirmative
relief should be included in a consent decree wherever they are
appropriate or necessary to fulfill the make-whole objectives of
Title VII.
Back Pay. The most obvious form of compensatory relief
for past discrimination is back pay. Specifically provided for in
the statute, 4 back pay compensates the victims of discrimina-
tion for wages lost due to the past discrimination, limited,
however, to the period of two years before the charge was filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) .5
Back pay is probably the most strongly resisted of all Title
VII remedies. However, in a strong show of support for this
form of relief, the Supreme Court, in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,'" concluded that when employees or applicants for
employment have lost the opportunity to earn wages because
an employer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory em-
ployment practice, "backpay should be denied only for reasons
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central sta-
tutory purpose of eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination."' 7 Therefore, if the Title VII prac-
titioner believes she has a winning case, there exists a firm
basis for demanding back pay; if the chances for success in
litigation are less definite, counsel, when drafting a proposed
settlement, will have to determine the extent to which a full
back pay award should be compromised. Arriving at a proper
back pay award can be a complex task and the practitioner has
little help beyond a careful analysis of the circumstances sur-
rounding previous awards. Although the courts have shown
strong support for the award of back pay, as one commentator
noted:
[n]ot many have thus far dealt with the complex problem
of determining the amount of back pay due members of a
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(Supp. V 1975).
15. Id.
16. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
17. Id. at 421. The Court noted that if a district court declines to award backpay,
it should carefully articulate its reasons. Id. The Court premised this decision on the
"make whole" purpose underlying Title VII, see note 11 and accompanying text, supra,
and the definition in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), that the
primary objective of Title VII was a prophylactic one, and that the threat of back-
pay provides the spur or catalyst which causes employers to evaluate their employment
practices. Id. at 417-18.
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class found to be the victims of unlawful discrimination,
and no definite standards have been established in the
area to guide the courts and counsel. Back pay awards
have been tailored largely to the circumstances of the par-
ticular class . . . .18
Economic fringe benefits. Monetary relief is not limited to
recovery of lost wages, but can extend also to recovery for the
loss of any economic fringe benefit resulting from discrimina-
tion including, for example, pension rights and disability bene-
fits."9 As with back pay, it may be difficult to determine the
amount to which the aggrieved party is entitled. In one case,
this problem was rectified by providing that for every year a
female or minority employee works in a previously under-
represented category, he or she would receive two years worth
of credit for fringe benefits.2"
Promotions or transfers. Compensatory relief may consist
not only of economic benefits but, where required to fulfill the
goals of Title VII, may include promotions or transfers of the
victims of past discrimination. The rationale behind this type
of relief is to place the aggrieved parties in the positions they
would have occupied were it not for the violations of Title VII.
This type of remedy may be provided via the outright promo-
tion or transfer of particular employees or by the implementa-
tion of training programs designed to ensure the mobility of
employees who were discriminated against.2 '
18. Specter & Spiegelman, Employment Discrimination Action Under Federal
Civil Rights Act in 21 Am. JuR. Trials §91, at 116(1974).
19. Id. § 92, at 117.
20. Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, Alvaniz v.
California Processors, Inc., No. C-73-2153 WHO, at 12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1975) [on
file at SANTA CLARA L. Riv.]. It should be noted that there has been intervention on
this proposed decree but not on the basis of these fringe benefit agreements.
21. For example, in Consent Decree, Wells v. Bank of America, No. C-71-409
CBR (N.D. Cal., filed July 24, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Bank of America Decree],
a very unique and detailed system was developed for the promotion and mobility of
the aggrieved employees. The defendant bank established fou trust funds which
provided $3,750,000 for four different types of training programs leading to such promo-
tions or transfers. A management and training trust was provided for female college
graduates in the lower employment classifications to train for management positions.
Id. at 15. Those women who had achieved managerial classifications were provided
with a self-development trust which provided individual grants. for the development
of their creative and intellectual capacities. Id. at 19. In addition, an international
development trust provided for advancement to more responsible positions in interna-
tional banking, id. at 23, and yet another fund provided individual and group grants
for all of the plaintiffs in support of their development of banking management skills.
Id. at 28.
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Recruitment of past applicants and former employees. In
addition to the compensatory forms of relief provided for those
who remain employed by the defendant, those who have been
dismissed or not hired due to discriminatory practices may be
made whole by affirmative recruitment which will place them
in their rightful position. A provision establishing this type of
relief should require the defendant to accord those who have
not been employed, or who have been fired in violation of Title
VII, priority status upon reapplication for employment.2
Corrective Affirmative Relief
In addition to the compensatory methods, the corrective
affirmative modes of relief are designed to remedy any present
and continuing effects of past discrimination. These affirma-
tive modes include specific goals for hiring and promotions,
corrective training programs, procedures for the validation of
testing and minimum position requirements, employee recruit-
ment programs and methods for eliminating discriminatory
stereotypes. The inclusion of these types of corrective remedies
is appropriate whenever the consequences of past discrimina-
tory policies are likely to continue to have a discriminatory
effect even after the rescission of such policies.
Goals and timetables. The most controversial area of
corrective affirmative relief is that of promotional and hiring
goals which constitute the major portion of many, if not most,
affirmative action plans. As the following discussion will indi-
cate, this form of relief attempts to ensure the active participa-
tion of employers in building a work force reflecting the avail-
able pool of workers for the job in question.
Despite this objective, the 1964 Civil Rights Act precludes
preferential treatment of "any individual or to any group be-
cause of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such
individual or group." 3 Therefore, the hiring or promotion of
unqualified women or minorities over qualified white males, as
part of a corrective hiring program, is illegal under Title VII.
It is the confusion over the distinction between the estab-
22. Wells v. Bank of America, which involved discrimination against women who
had applied for positions as management trainees, resulted in a decree which provided
that "women college graduates who can be satisfactorily identified as having unsuc-
cessfully applied for employment as a management trainee with the (defendant]
between January 1, 1969 and May 1, 1973, shall, upon reapplication for a management
training position, receive priority consideration." Id. at 28.
23. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j)(Supp. V 1975).
[Vol. 18
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lishment of these goals and an absolute requirement to meet
them which has aroused a chorus of dissent over this type of
affirmative corrective relief. Rather than being absolute, how-
ever, these affirmative action goals, which have been approved
by the courts,24 are based on both the availability of qualified
persons and the anticipated vacancy rate. As explained by Dr.
Bernice Sandler, Director of the Project on the Status of Edu-
cation of Women, "[g]oals are an attempt to estimate what
the employer's work force would look like if no illegal discrimi-
nation based on race or sex had ever existed."'25
Though the obligation to meet the goal is not absolute,
efforts must be made through recruitment, impartial testing,
and interview practices to find well qualified persons among
the group(s) previously excluded. Only in a small number of
extreme cases, where a long history of institution-wide discrim-
ination has been demonstrated, are absolute quotas used."6
Absent these extreme circumstances, flexible corrective goals
are the preferred alternative. Thus, it is important to consider
the manner in which these goals are established.
Goals are initially determined by examining the "relevant
labor force," or the employer's potential applicant pool, and
determining what percentage of that pool is minority and fem-
ale. For example, in the proposed consent decree in Garza v.
County of Monterey,27 the relevant labor force was drawn from
the county labor force as determined by the California Employ-
ment Development Department." Alternatively, in Mueller v.
Greyhound Lines West, 9 since Greyhound recruited nation-
ally, the applicant pool was the "national work-force." Finally,
in Gray v. Tribune Publishing Co.,30 the decree designated two
counties, where the newspaper was generally circulated, as the
24. See Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293 (D.
Mass. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E. D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
25. Affirmative (In) Action: How Do You Read It, EQUAL RIGHTS MONITOR,
January/February, 1977, at 9 [hereinafter cited as Affirmative (In) Action].
26. Id.
27. Proposed Consent Decree, Garza v. County of Monterey, No. C-73-2074
RFP(SJ) (N.D. Cal. 1976) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.] [hereinafter cited as
County of Monterey Decree].
28. Id. at 12-13.
29. Consent Decree, Mueller v. Greyhound Lines West, No. C-74-1021 WHO
(N.D. Cal. 1976)[hereinafter cited as Greyhound Decree].
30. Tribune Decree, supra note 6.
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area containing their applicant pool." As a result, the size of
the relevant labor force or applicant pool turns on the circum-
stances of the individual case. It is up to the individual practi-
tioner to determine what applicant pool will best serve the
interests of his client and the objectives of Title VII.
After the appropriate labor force has been established, the
particular employer's work force must be examined and com-
pared to it. This comparison generally yields a disparity be-
tween the percentage of women and minorities in the em-
ployer's work force and the corresponding percentage in the
relevant labor force. Based on this disparity, the goal of the
corrective plan is to achieve "parity," that is, to have the work
force adequately reflect the labor force." It cannot be overem-
phasized that the goals must be realistic, and should not, for
instance, require the defendant to employ more persons from
a minority group than are currently available and qualified for
any particular position.3 As noted in Rios v. Enterprise Asso-
ciation Steamfitters Local 638,11 the figures upon which the
goals are based must be relevant, rational, and explained. The
court should be guided by the most precise standards and sta-
tistics currently available.35
After arriving at the parity figure, the number of years over
which it is to be achieved must be determined. By estimating
how many vacancies generally arise, and what portion of that
number should be hired from the claimant's group, one can
arrive at the number of years the entire process should take.3
31. Id. at 4 & exhibit A.
32. FAuR EMPLOYMEN LmGATION, supra note 6, at 450.
33. For example, if the general labor force is 25% Spanish-surnamed, it may not
be realistic to expect the employer to meet a goal of hiring 25% Spanish-surnamed
individuals in a professional category. The Title VII practitioner should, for example,
contact professional schools to determine the number of minorities graduating and the
projections of the number of minority graduates for the next 5 years.
34. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 633.
36. It should be noted that there are conflicts which arise when an attorney is
representing both minority employees and non-minority women in a Title VII dispute.
Most practitioners represent either minorities or women, and it is better to do so rather
than represent the interests of both. On a theoretical level, there does not appear to
be a problem in representing both groups (or any number of oppressed groups), for the
employer's relevant labor force has X% minority, X% women, and from those per-
centages goals are established. However, should any compromise be required in order
to gain the benefits of a consent decree, the interests of women and minorities could
readily conflict with one attorney representing those conflicting intrests.
Another problem which might arise if the practitioner is representing both women
and minorities or is developing, for example, an affirmative action plan for women
when the employer already has a plan for minorities, is the problem of "double-
[Vol. 18
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Finally, the decree should specify how the hiring timetable
was established and provide for its annual revision based on a
reexaminination of the most current relevant labor force statis-
tics and the company's hiring and promotion performance over
the preceding year."
Training programs. As previously noted, training pro-
grams may provide compensatory benefits, allowing for trans-
fers and promotions.3" In their corrective mode, such programs
perform one of two distinct functions. First, they may affirma-
tively encourage female and minority employees to move into
those positions where they have traditionally been underrepre-
sented. Second, they may be used to convey the corrective
programs' aims and provisions to the personnel who will be
instrumental in implementing it.
Examples of programs which have been developed to fulfill
the first function include: individual evaluation and counsel-
ing, 9 individual or group assessment of the full spectrum of
career opportunities, 0 formal career development opportunity
counting." The employer may hire a minority female and count her as both a woman
and a minority under the plan-literally a "two for the price of one" approach. On a
theoretical level, this double-counting should not be necessary, for the employer
would want to have his work force reflect the labor force and would want to attempt
to achieve his goals, counting the minority woman as a minority or a woman. But the
consent decree is a compromise. In order to gain its benefits for her plaintiffs, counsel
may allow for a limited amount of double-counting. Counsel, however, will also have
to determine just how much double-counting to allow, considering all the factors
involved.
37. In the County of Monterey Decree, supra note 27, at app. A, for instance,
each job category (such as professional, technical, office and clerical, etc.) was first
examined and the total number of employees in that category, as well as the number
of those employees were white, black, Spanish-surnamed or "other", was noted. Next,
the disparity between the present work force and the relevant labor force was deter-
mined. Last, the plan delineated how many black, Spanish-surnamed and "other"
employees would constitute the goal of the County of Monterey to have employed in
the number of years allotted to reach parity, thereby making the county's work force
a reflection of the relevant labor force.
Next, each county department (such as Sheriff, District Attorney, etc.) was exam-
ined for the same factors. Id. app. B. The reason for establishing goals for each depart-
ment, as well as for each job category, was to achieve parity in each of the departments.
Absent this procedure, the members of minority groups subsequently hired might end
up concentrated within a single department. For example, the job category of profes-
sional requires five black employees in order to meet an affirmative action goal. If the
district attorney hired five blacks, thereby meeting the county's goal in the professional
category, the other departments-medical center, sheriff, etc.-would have no affirma-
tive goal to reach and could ostensibly maintain an all-white male hierarchy. There-
fore, the Title VII practitioner should strive for a work force integrated at all levels
and in all areas even though the statistical "groundwork" may be laborious.
38. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
39. Xerox Settlement, supra note 13, at 5.
40. Id.
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instruction,"' funding for career change as well as career devel-
opment,42 part-time or summer employment as a means of
training,43 and funding programs.44 This list of possible pro-
grams is by no means exhaustive, and, as with all substantive
provisions in any consent decree, it will vary depending on the
needs of the employees in question.
However, since the ultimate objective of any corrective
program is to direct persons into those positions for which they
are qualified and interested, training should not be used by the
employer to impede that progression. Therefore, the agreement
should specify the type of training which is to be offered.45 Nor
should the training be required across-the-board, since some
employees may be ready for transfer or promotion without fur-
ther training, and the employer should not be allowed to use
uniformly required training as a stumbling block to advance-
ment.48
Turning to the second function of a corrective training
program, those employees who will be instrumental in imple-
menting the affirmative action program should not merely be
notified of its provisions, but trained to implement it. The
consent decree should therefore include specific methods for
training those who will be responsible for or involved in recruit-
ment efforts,. hiring decisions or training programs. 7
In addition, a decree aimed at eradicating sex discrimina-
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Consent Decree, NAACP v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., No. 70-302-GT at 4(S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 1972) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.][hereinafter cited as
NAACP Decree].
44. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21 at 10.
45. Bellamy, Blank, Goodman, Kelly & Stanley, Affirmative Action in Practice;
A Preliminary Report to the Ford Foundation 42 (Feb. 28, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Ford Foundation Report]. Despite the excellent training provisions in Leisner v. New
York Telephone Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8871, at 5693 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), one woman
received training which was almost meaningless because the company offered a variety
of courses and the agreement had not specified that training was to be technical rather
than in administrative areas. Id.
46. Cf. Leisner v. New York Telephone Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8871, at 5691(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (consent decree providing that once women had transferred or been
promoted, they would be given the training they needed to keep their new jobs). Id.
at 5693; see Ford Foundation Report, supra note 46, at 42.
47. For example, the Greyhound Decree, supra note 29, provided that: "each
year during the term of this Agreement, Company will conduct a seminar for Company
employees who are involved in the recruitment, interviewing, training or evaluation of
Applicants or Trainees." Id. at 8. The decree further required that plaintiff's attorney
would be invited to attend the training and make a presentation if the parties agreed.
Id.
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tion should further specify that a portion of the training be
directed at the elimination of stereotypes." One settlement
decree examined, for example, provided for training "to elimi-
nate preconceived ideas of jobs that might be thought of as
'male jobs' or 'female jobs."'4
Validation of testing and job specifications. In the past,
job applicants and employees seeking transfer or promotion
have frequently fallen victim to an employer's practice of arbi-
trarily requiring a college degree or a high school diploma when
such qualifications were not essential or even necessarily useful
to the sucessful performance of the job in question. 0 In Griggs
v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court condemned this type of
arbitrary practice, demanding that testing must reasonably
measure job performance. 5' Therefore, a good consent decree
should require employers to "validate" any existing testing
procedures and job specifications to ensure that they are job
related and not simply perpetuating illegal discrimination.
Recruitment. In its corrective mode,52 recruitment focuses
on the employer's affirmative efforts to make women and mi-
norities aware of, and encourage their application for, openings
for positions in which they have been previously underrepre-
sented. These recruitment efforts can either be directed to non-
employees outside the company or toward in-house employees.
In order to encourage the application of the underrepre-
sented from the labor force, many comprehensive decrees have
required the defendant to maintain a file of women and minori-
ties who have previously applied for employment but have not
been hired (generally called an affirmative action file) and to
notify them of openings. 3 Job openings should also be adver-
tised in a wide range of publications including those read
mainly by women and minorities, with organizations whose
membership predominately includes women and minorities,
and with radio and television stations with a predominately
female or minority audience. 4 In addition to these forms of
48. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
49. Xerox Settlement, supra note 13, at 7.
50. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. 401 U.S. at 436.
52. Recruitment may also serve a compensatory function when the employer
recruits those people who have been dismissed or not hired due to discriminatory
practices. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
53. See, e.g., Consent Decree, Lewis v. FMC Corp., No. C-74-2327 RFP, at 14
(N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 10, 1976) [hereinafter cited as FMC Decree].
54. The Greyhound decree was especially thorough in this respect, providing lists
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outside advertising, many decrees require, as part of affirma-
tive recruitment, that notices of job opportunities also be
posted for the benefit of "in-house" employees. Where such
notices are used they should be sufficiently conspicuous to at-
tract the attention of the employees at the company's facility.
The mere posting of an inconspicuous or unintelligible "notice"
should not suffice. 55
But "getting the word out" through clear and conspicuous
forms of notice is only one-half of recruitment; the other half
is getting the recruits in. One of the major problems with af-
firmative action has been the failure of most plans to encourage
people who have grown disillusioned by past discrimination to
take advantage of new opportunities when they are offered.
Therefore, the decree should stipulate how the employer will
encourage applicants to train and compete for higher positions.
The Wells v. Bank of America" decree presents a particu-
larly good example of this aspect of recruiting efforts. As an
incentive for women to participate in a training program, each
participant received $1500 for each year she had been employed
by the bank. Thus, this decree deals with the encouragement
problem directly by offering monetary incentives and this un-
doubtedly explains why the company was able to fill its train-
ing program so quickly. 5"
Another similar problem arises when the agreement pro-
vides for the opening of traditionally "men's" jobs to women.
Peer pressure may dissuade some women from applying or from
staying on the jobs once they have secured them. If it appears
that this might be a problem, the decree could provide that
women be sent into new jobs in teams, rather than propelling
them, by themselves, into what could be intimidating circum-
stances."
Stereotyping. When the ill to be remedied by a decree is
sex discrimination, it should call for the elimination of stereo-
typing. A provision designed to eliminate this problem might
of about 12 newspapers in each of four regions; approximately 15 magazines for each
region; and 50-90 women's organizations in each region. Greyhound Decree, supra note
29, exhibits 3, 4, 5.
55. See Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 55-56.
56. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21.
57. Id. at 16; Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 49. In addition, in order
to encourage trainees to complete the program, each trainee was to receive $1,000 upon
beginning training, another $1,000 during the middle of the program and any remain-
der upon completion of the course. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21, at 18.
58. Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 55-56.
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provide for the revision of "any language which might imply a
preference of one sex over another in any job where there is not
a bona fide occupational qualification based on sex" in such
documents as personnel manuals, job descriptions and employ-
ment applications. 9 As with the team concept discussed above,
provisions designed to eliminate stereotyping can make poten-
tially intimidating circumstances more liveable.
Implementing the Decree
The discussion thus far has focused on the proscriptive,
compensatory and corrective benefits which should be included
in a consent decree. However, providing for the existence of
such benefits is only one-half of the solution; the other half is
providing for their implementation: "[Aiffirmative action
plans, whether they are private plans or plans imposed by the
government, have failed in large part because the affected com-
panies have not been aggressive about implementing them." 0
Although essentially a procedural matter, the method of imple-
mentation should, as do the benefits, form a portion of the
substantive provisions of the decree. What follows, therefore,
is a discussion of the two general, but highly important, aspects
of implementation: notice and compliance.
Notice. Three types of notices will usually be required
when implementing a decree: notice to the class of plaintiffs,
notice to potential recipients of certain benefits, and notice to
employees and community members. Two important consider-
ations permeate all three types of notice. First, the effective-
ness of the notice should be evaluated in tort terminology, i.e.,
would a reasonable person read and respond to this notice when
it is seen? Second, the form and content of all notices should
be agreed on by the parties and be incorporated as part of the
decree.
As indicated above, notice must first be sent to the class
of plaintiffs represented in the suit. Although some Title VII
class actions are brought under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires notice to class mem-
bers at the initiation of the action and allows each member to
"opt out," most are brought under Rule 23(b)(2). Under the
latter rule, the first notice sent to members of the class will be
59. Xerox Settlement, supra note 13.
60. Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 53.
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one informing them of the provisions of the decree and asking
them if they wish to be included or to intervene.'
The notice sent pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) generally in-
cludes the following information: the identity of the defendants
to the lawsuit; the allegations of the complaint; the identity of
the class; that the defendant has denied liability but is entering
into this settlement; the date, time and location of the hearing
whereby it will be determined if the court should accept the
decree; a general outline of the terms of the decree; where the
complete proposed decree may be obtained; and that a class
member satisfied with the terms of the decree need not appear
at the hearing.2
Although most of the decrees examined did not do so, it is
strongly advised that a succinct one-page personal letter from
the plaintiff's attorney accompany the notice to the class. The
letter should refer to the recipient by name and indicate the
reason for the letter. 3 The letter should also explain the exist-
ence and nature of the lawsuit and include a description of the
proposed settlement. In addition, it should inform the recipi-
ents where they or their attorneys can obtain further informa-
tion concerning the settlement and should inform them of their
potential rights and any deadlines for pursuing such rights. 4
In addition to these substantive matters, the form of the
notice sent should be sufficiently conspicuous to attract the
attention of persons to whom it is directed. Forms of notices
have been held inadequate on this point in the past because of
their brevity 5 as well as their length." The practitioner should
61. According to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), notice under a Rule 23(b)(2) action is
discretionary.
62. It should again be emphasized that the consent decree is a compromise. The
defendant may, for example,.want the notice phrased in such a way as to play down
the fact that back pay benefits are available. The Title VII attorney will have to decide
here, as in other like situations, whether such a compromise is preferable in view of
the total benefits to be gained therefrom.
63. For example, the letter might begin with the phrase: "As a female employee
of X Co. or "As a woman who submitted an application for employment to X
Co .. ,
64. Interview with Russell W. Galloway, Jr., former staff attorney for the Affirm-
ative Action Compliance Unit of the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, California,
in Santa Clara, Cal. (Jan. 10, 1978).
65. For example, the substance of the notice given pursuant to the FMC Decree,
supra note 54, was adequate, but the form was inadequate because it would not attract
the attention of the reasonable person to the extent that a document of its importance
should. It was printed on one side of an 8 1.2" x 11" sheet, the print was extremely
small and the language was technical. If one wished to be excluded from the class or
to object, it was necessary to write to the court, appropriately refer to the case in
contention, and act by a certain date which was also inconspicuous.
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therefore ensure that the notice sent will both attract the atten-
tion of the recipient and encourage her to investigate its de-
tails.
In appropriate circumstances, it may be necessary to send
notice to previous victims of discrimination (e.g., those who
have been discharged or not hired) in order to inform them of
their rights under the provisions of the proposed settlement. As
with notice to the class, the objective should be to gain the
attention of the reasonable person. The notice sent to the
women eligible for training programs under the decree in Wells
v. Bank of America"7 illustrates this point. In that case, after
the parties agreed to the substance of the notification letter, a
form was enclosed on which the addressee need only mark
"yes" or "no" as to whether she wished to participate, and a
self-addressed envelope was enclosed. Addressees from whom
no reply was received in two weeks were to receive a second,
identical letter marked "last notice," and if no reply was re-
ceived two weeks thereafter, the answer was deemed to be neg-
ative.8
The decree should also contain provision for notifying all
employees and members of the community who will be instru-
mental in implementing the affirmative action program. For
example, in the NAA CP v. Imperial Irrigation District9 decree,
each supervisor or member of the defendant's personnel de-
partment was to be instructed, either individually or in a
group, regarding the provisions of the plan; a summary of the
plan was to be posted in the employee newspaper, newsletter,
and on the bulletin boards and was to become part of the
orientation for new employees; and defendants were to contact
by letter or in person the placement and guidance officers of
all local high schools and colleges to explain the provisions of
the affirmative action program. 0 It should be noted here, how-
66. The notice given pursuant to the Greyhound Decree, supra note 29, was
printed on 8 ," x 11" paper and double spaced in large type. Because of the print,
the notice was eight pages long; however, the second page contained an underscored
sentence warning the reader that her rights might be affected by the "proposed settle-
ment described in this notice." This notice was very thorough; however, its length may
have "lost" some of its intended recipients. If counsel should decide that a long notice
is necessary, it would be preferable to indicate, on the first page, why the notice is
personally important to the reader and emphasize what actions and deadlines will be
important to that person.
67. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21.
68. Id. at 15.
69. NAACP Decree, supra note 43.
70. Id. at 8.
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ever, that the form and substance of all writings and the sub-
stance of the training programs should be approved by both
parties in advance and incorporated as part of the decree. Also,
it would be preferable to have group meetings with current
employees to explain the parameters of the affirmative action
program, so they have advance notice of the changes which will
take place.
Compliance. As noted earlier, the best of benefits will ben-
efit no one unless they are implemented and, even more impor-
tantly, unless provisions for compliance are included in the
decree.
In order to be effective the decree must be monitored by
both parties. To ensure rigorous compliance, it is best to desig-
nate a specific company official to monitor the defendant com-
pany's compliance with the decree.7 Part of this official's du-
ties should include keeping records of compliance and prepar-
ing periodic reports based on those records. The substance of
the records will vary depending on the various forms of relief
involved, but their objective is to provide those monitoring the
decree with the information required to determine if its goals
are being met. In the Bank of America decree, where the spe-
cific reporting forms had been agreed to by the parties, the
record provision provided: "Said reports shall set forth statisti-
cal and documentary data with respect to progress in the
achievement of affirmative action goals as set forth herein,
recruitment and hiring practices, training, promotions, trans-
fers, turnover and salaries."7
Similarly, the settlement in Mueller v. Greyhound Lines
West provided for an especially inclusive list of records and (as
should be done in all decrees) provided examples of each form
to be used and incorporated these into the decree.73
Although all decrees provide that the EEOC or plaintiff's
attorneys shall receive copies of progress reports made by the
defendant, the Bank of America decree went well beyond this
minimum requirement. It stipulated that semiannual reports
71. In recognition of the importance of its affirmative action duties, the Bank of
America appointed a vice-president to head its own monitoring activities. Ford Foun-
dation Report, supra note 46, at 51. And as part of its program, Xerox established the
position of Employee Resource Programs Manager and Female Affirmative Action
Manager in each of its regions to report to the Regional Personnel Manager. Xerox
Settlement, supra note 13, at 11.
72. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21, at 31.
73. Greyhound Decree, supra note 29, at 14-18, exhibit 11.
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were to be made to the plaintiff's attorney, if desired an audit
might be conducted to determine the accuracy of all the infor-
mation,74 and that the bank was obligated to pay the plaintiff's
attorney a substantial fee for her continued monitoring of the
program .
Compliance monitoring is greatly facilitated if, whenever
the employer is required to act under the decree, by giving
notice or otherwise, provisions are made for deadlines. For ex-
ample, in the Bank of America decree, the bank was required
to select women eligible for training programs. The evaluation
and selection of these women was to be completed within
ninety days of the effective date of the decree. In addition to
this tight schedule, the bank was required to supply the plain-
tiff's attorney with specific information about each potential
beneficiary and the results of all evaluations.7"
In addition to providing for deadlines, some decrees pro-
mote implementation of their programs by providing that man-
agers' success in meeting the objectives of the affirmative ac-
tion program "will be an important factor in their own perform-
ance appraisals for compensation purposes."77 One must keep
in mind that this provision may only be effective if it too is
monitored.78
Finally, consent decrees should provide not only for effec-
tive monitoring but they should also stipulate what will be
considered a failure to comply with the terms of the decree.
Whomever is responsible for monitoring the program for the
plaintiffs, must decide if any given deviation is sufficient to be
considered noncompliance. Many decrees define noncompli-
ance in terms of any "significant" or "substantial" deviation
from the prescribed goals. Thus, in the Leisner v. New York
Telephone Co. settlement, any deviation of 2% forced the com-
pany to justify its failure to comply.7" Precision in drafting
these provisions is important to those responsible for monitor-
ing, and to the defendant company since it needs to know the
74. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21, at 32.
75. Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 51.
76. Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 44.
77. Xerox Settlement, supra note 13, at 9. See also Bank of America Decree,
supra note 21, at 9.
78. See, e.g.,Bank of America Decree, supra note 21, at 9. The Bank of America
decree provided for such monitoring by making the evaluations available for inspec-
tion.
79. Leisner v. New York Telephone Co., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8871, at 5693
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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nature of compliance.8 0
In providing for allegations of noncompliance, the decree
should set out definite procedures for the complaining party to
follow, as well as a time frame within which the company must
respond. Similarly, the decree should establish the nature of
the showing that the plaintiff will be required to make in sup-
port of a claim of noncompliance. The Bank of America decree
dealt with these issues by placing the burden of proof on the
bank to demonstrate that it had made good faith efforts to
comply with the plan.8' Alternatively, in Gray v. Tribune Pub-
lishing Co., the decree placed the burden on the plaintiffs to
show that the defendant had not made a good faith attempt to
meet its goals.82
In each instance, the company's "good faith" is "at the
heart" of the compliance issue but it generally goes undefined
in the consent decree. 3 A definition of good faith would clearly
facilitate the monitoring of compliance. Therefore, if the decree
is to be successful, it seems that the practitioner should make
a colorable attempt to define this term.
CONCLUSION
The compensating and implementing provisions of a con-
sent decree outlined in this comment are not meant to cover
every conceivable situation that may confront the Title VII
practitioner. Nevertheless, it should provide a set of broad
guidelines which will enable the individual practitioner to pro-
vide adequate representation for clients in Title VII consent
decree negotiations. It must be kept in mind, however, that it
is the needs of the represented class that dictate the terms of
any consent decree. For the decree to be successful, this prem-
ise must govern the relief provisions included in the settle-
ment."
Despite the broad remedial aims of Title VII and its relief
provisions, in its thirteen years of existence it does not appear
to have eradicated the employment inequities against which it
was directed. Women and minorities are still clustered at the
80. Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 52.
81. Bank of America Decree, supra note 21, at 30.
82. Tribune Decree, supra note 6, at 9.
83. See Ford Foundation Report, supra note 45, at 59-60. But see FMC Decree,
supra note 53, at 7. The FMC decree created a rebuttable presumption of good faith
if FMC spent $20,000 annually for training.
84. See also Specter, supra note 18, § 156, at 211.
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bottom of the employment spectrum. 5 Gradually, effective
Title VII consent decrees are beginning to alleviate this prob-
lem. In providing for compensatory benefits which make the
victims of discrimination "whole," and in stipulating exacting
implementation and compliance procedures, the Title VII
practitioner is helping to create concrete employment oppor-
tunities, where only illusory promises previously existed.
Barbara Spector
85. In 1962, the median earnings of a woman working full time was 59% of the
median income earned by a male working full time. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 383, table 617 (1976).
In 1974, she earned 57% of the median income of her male counterpart. Id. In 1969,
the median wage earned by a black male was 68% of that earned by a white male. Id.
at 373-76, table 602.

